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ABSTRACT 
Proper estimation of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) depends largely on accurate estimation of Safety performance in 
terms of average Probability of Failure on Demand, (PFDavg). For complex architectures of logic solvers, sensors, and 
valves, this can be calculated by distinguishing combinations of subsystems with basic (K-out-of-N) KooN approach 
for identical components. In the case of the typical configurations of valves for a burner management systems with 
non-identical subsystem configurations the KooN approach does not apply. Hence, it becomes an issues to calculate 
the correct safety performance since some of the established methods give too optimistic results due to lack of 
Common cause Failure information and data on non-identical components or sub-systems. This paper formulates a 
Markov model for determination of average probability of failure on demand for non-identical components and also 
proposes a more conservative lowest failure rate approach and maximum beta factor contrary to pragmatic minimum 
or average beta for correct estimation of average probability of failure on demand. It   can be deduced that the 
measure of safety performance for components or subsystems with unequal failure rates depends largely on common 
cause failure, but a single beta factor is not appropriate to model the commonality of the failure.  The result revealed 
that both geometric mean and lowest failure rate approaches result in different 𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 values with the lowest failure 
rate being the most conservative and optimistic result. 
 
Keywords: burner management systems, probability of failure on demand, common cause failure, KooN 
configurations, and lowest failure rate, Markov Analysis. 
 
NOMENCLATURE: 
CCF –  Common  Cause Failure  
KooN – K-out-of N redundant arrangement 
PFD – Probability  of failure on demand 
β –      Conditional probability that a component fails 
due to common cause given that there is a failure 
𝜷𝑨,𝑩 – Representative of maximal of 𝛽𝐴 and 𝛽𝐵  
𝜷𝑨,𝑩,𝑪 – Representative of maximal of 𝛽𝐴 , 𝛽𝐵  and 𝛽𝐶  
𝑪𝑲𝒐𝒐𝑵 - Configuration factor for KooN channel 
architecture. 
𝝀𝑪 - Common cause failure 
𝝉 - Proof test interval 
Pij – Probability from state i to j 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the process industry, the plant is designed to keep 
the process within specified parameters considered 
acceptable for normal and safe operation. However, 
when a process exceeds the pre-defined set point such 
as overpressure in a vessel due to mass, moles, or 
energy accumulated in a contained volume or space 
with restricted outflow or excessively high temperature 
arise from loss of control of reactors and heater [1] as a 
result of variation in process parameters, the 
dangerous condition may occur. If the situation is not 
addressed, it can often lead to hazardous events with 
potential consequence to human life or plant assets. 
Conversely, the risk associated with such a process 
variation may be reduced with adequate knowledge of 
safety instrumented systems (SIS) such as Burner 
Management systems, BMS. 
A SIS is a system composed of any combination of 
sensors, logic solvers, and finial elements and the main 
significant purpose of a SIS is to bring the systems it 
supervises to a safe state, i.e. in a situation where it 
does not create a risk for environment or people 
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whenever the equipment under control (EUC) goes to a 
hazardous situation causing a real risk to people or 
environment [2]. 
Since a SIS protects against hazardous conditions, it is 
imperative for the system itself to be dependable and 
the dependability of a SIS is related to its functionality 
and integrity. Safety Integrity Level, SIL is a 
quantitative index that indicates the acceptable 
probability of dangerous failure that a system can have 
to consider it appropriate for a given safety integrity 
requirement [3]. The international standard for 
handling functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems, IEC61508 uses four discrete level to 
classify integrity level with SIL1 as the lowest (least 
reliable) and SIL4 as the highest (most reliable). 
The probability of failure on demand expresses the 
safety performance of safety instrumented function. 
Articles [2 – 4], use simplified formula based on 
approximation to calculate PFDs of SIL and this method 
is extended to generalized K-out-of–N configurations. 
The simplified formula consists of two main elements 
only: failure rate and proof test. IEC61508 uses SIL as a 
measure of the risk –reduction level of the safety 
function; hence, the SIL is estimated from the 
probability of failure on demand. For a low demand 
mode, the required PFD is related to unavailability, 
𝑈(𝑡) of the SIF. 
 
2. A BURNER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
A burner management system is to ascertain a safe 
start-up, operation, monitor and shut off the fuel supply 
in the event of dangerous conditions (such as low fuel 
pressure, high fuel pressure and loss of flame). Figure 
(1) represents the architecture of shutdown valves on a 
typical burner management system with different SIFs 
architecture. The safety function consists of a 1oo2 
series configuration voted in 6oo6 architecture in the 
Main gas SSOVs to ensure that all the six valves close in 
case of high pressure provided that one out of two 
(1oo2) configuration valve close on demand. Also a 
1oo3 series configuration valve is voted with 6oo6 
architecture to ensure that one out of three valves close 
in order to bring all the 6oo6 ignition gas SSOVs to safe 
state whenever sit required on demand. 
In Figure 2, the channels can be distinguished as: 
Channel A comprises SSOV01X1 and SSOV01X3 in a 
1oo2-arrangement with identical 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒) for 
both valves, where X denotes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
Channel B comprises six Channels A’s in 6oo6-
arrangement, with identical PFD’s, 
Channel C comprises SSOV012 and Channel B in 1oo2-
arrangement, where the 𝑃𝐹𝐷’𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔  for these two 
valves is not identical. 
 
Figure 1: Valves Configuration in Burner Management 
Systems 
 
Figure 2: Voting of the main gas 
 
The main issue in evaluating the probability of failure 
on demand for the gas valves is that PFD of 1oo2-
arrangement of channel B and C is not identical, 
therefore, the PFD generic formula for K-out-of-N 
identical component cannot be used in such 
configuration. While failure events from independent 
faults (i.e. the probability of both failure occur) can be 
modelled by simply multiplying their probabilities of 
occurrence.𝑃(𝐴). 𝑃(𝐵), but dependent failure shows a 
different probability thus: 
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴). 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐵). 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵)
≠ 𝑃(𝐴). 𝑃(𝐵)                                       (1) 
For simplicity, figure 3 is further presented as  
 
Figure 3: Reduced 1oo2 configuration for non-identical 
component 
 
Based on the assumption that the poorer valve (in this 
case valve B) improved safety performance, the PFDavg 
for 1oo2 configuration show in figure 3is expressed by 





𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴 . 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐵 + 𝛽𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴               ( 2) 
In order to assign the safety integrity level in a system 
that provides multiple layer of defense against 
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complete functional failure, the estimation of the PFD 
must be sufficiently accurate to depict the SIF 
unavailability. Hence, common cause failure influences 
the numerical value of the PFD as result of components, 
sub-system dependency. However, if the contribution is 
ignored in probabilistic risk assessment it may lead to 
underestimation of unavailability of the SIF.  
 
3. COMMON CAUSE FAILURE 
To enhance reliability or availability of a SIS against 
random failures, redundancy is often implemented in 
the system configuration. However, redundancy 
introduced a subclass of dependent failures called 
common-cause failure (CCF)[6]which dominant effect 
drastically reduced intended benefit of redundancy. 
Thus, common-cause failures can result in the SIS 
failing to perform its intended function when a demand 
occurs. 
The definition of CCF is not consistent, even, there are 
discrepancies in the definition of CCF among SIS related 
standards. It was pointed out in [6] that there is no 
generally accepted definition of CCF. This connotes that 
people in different sectors have different opinions 
about common cause failure. IEC61508 (2010) defines 
a CCF as: 
A failure that is the result of one or more events, 
causing concurrent failures of two or more separate 
channels in a multiple channel system, leading to a 
system failure[7]. 
PDS[7], the fraction of CCFs (β) is defined as “The 
fraction of failure of a single component that causes 
both components of a redundant part to fail 
simultaneously” 
There are inconsistency and ambiguity regarding the 
definition and use of the terms random failures and 
systematic failures, and the way these are related to 
common cause failure (CCF)[8]. The reliability related 
to random hardware failure is quantified based on 
failure rate, but systematic failure cannot be accurately 
estimated because of its deterministic nature, however, 
IEC61508 standard suggests, as a general rule, not to 
quantify systematic failure. If systematic failure is 
neglected the predicted unavailability will be of lower 
value and less conservative compared with actual 
unavailability, but its contribution is not completely 
ignored in reliability quantification[9, 10]. 
However, PDS method uses the same classification as 
IEC61508, but gives a more detailed breakdown of the 
systematic failure as shown in figure 4. 
 
3.1 Existing Methods for CCF Modelling 
Common cause failures modelling can be addressed as 
either explicit or implicit model, but due to lack of 
sufficient information and data on CCFs the implicit (or 
parametric) model is developed to model CCFs by 
quantitatively taking into cognizance the effect of 
dependent failures in a system failure. The paper lays 
more emphasis on the beta (β)-factor model and the 
PDS method. 
β-factor is a single parameter model proposed by 
Fleming in 1975 and it has gained wide acceptance in 
quantifying CCF in process industry because of its 
simplicity. A crucial assumption in the model is that 
whenever a common cause event occurs, all the 
components in that specific CCF group are assumed to 
fail [8, 11]. 
 
Figure 4:   PDS failure classification adopted from [10] 
AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR BURNER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS  A. A. Okubanjo, et al 
 
Nigerian Journal of Technology,   Vol. 36, No. 4, October 2017          1221 
In IEC61508 standard, regardless of the voting 
configuration beta-factor (β) is the same for any KooN 
and the contribution of common cause failure based on 
this approach is equal to 𝜷
𝝀𝑫𝑼
𝟐
. The main drawback of 
the β-factor model is its inability to provide a 
distinction between the different numbers of multiple 
failures for systems with more than two units. For 
instance, a pressure transmitter voting in 2oo3 may fail 
due to CCF of two units. Figure 5illustrates β-model for 
a triplicate system.  
The PDS method is introduced to overcome the 
weakness of β-factor model especially in redundancy 
system and employ the same techniques for quantifying 
common cause failures (CCFs) as MBF (Multiple Beta 
Factor) discussed in [12]. 
 
Figure 5:  β-factor model for a triplicate system 
 
Furthermore, the method considered different 
multiplicity of failures for KooN configuration and has 
therefore, introduced a configuration factor, CKooN 
formula that modifies the contribution of CCFs for some 
typical voting configuration. 







(𝑁 − 𝑘 + 2)! (𝐾 − 1)!
                (3) 
For 𝐾 < 𝑁; 𝑁 = 2,3, … 
Where, CKooN is a configuration factor given in table 
1which depends on the voting configuration. 
 
Table 1 :Numerical values of 𝐶𝐾𝑜𝑜𝑁  and 𝐶𝑁 proposed by 
PDS method. Adopted from[3] also cited in [7] 
 CKOON 
𝐶𝑁 
K=1 K=2 K=3 K = 4 K = 5 
𝑁 = 2 1.0 - - - - 1.0 
𝑁 = 3 0.30 2.4 - - - 2.7 
𝑁 = 4 0.15 0.75 4.0 - - 4.9 
𝑁 = 5 0.08 0.45 1.2 6.0 - 7.7 
𝑁 = 6 0.04 0.26 0.8 1.6 8.1 10.8 
 
4. ESTIMATION OF 𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 BASED ON MARKOV 
ANALYSIS 
As a result of dependency in the channel, the average 
probability of failure on demand for the main gas is not 
just a product of probability of failure on demand. The 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔   is implicitly modelled with Markov analysis 
considering the sub-system in Figure 3 as channels with 
different failure rates and the contribution of channel 
CCF is also taken into account. In the Markov analysis, 
the system is considered to be in one of the four states 
at any time as detailed in Table 2. 
Tabel 2:System State 
State 
Probability 
State State description 
𝑷𝟎 0 
Components A & B are 
operational 
𝑷𝟏 1 
Component A is operational 
and Component B failed 
𝑷𝟐 2 
Component B is operational 
and Component A failed 
𝑷𝟑 3 Component A and B failed 
 
The transition from state 0 to 3 is due to common cause 
influence and it is known as absorbing state; the 
Markov state transition diagram is shown in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Markov state transition diagram adapted 
from[12] 
The following set of differential equations are obtained 
by applying Kolmogorov forward equation:  
𝑑𝑃0(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= (𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵 + 𝜆𝐶)𝑃0(𝑡)            (4) 
𝑑𝑃1(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑃0 (𝑡) − (𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵 +  𝜆𝐶)𝑃1(𝑡)    (5)  
𝑑𝑃2(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵𝑃0 (𝑡) − (𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴 +  𝜆𝐶)𝑃2(𝑡)     (6) 
𝑑𝑃3(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑃0 (𝑡) + (𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵 + 𝜆𝐶)𝑃1(𝑡)
+ (𝜆𝐷𝑈,𝐴 +  𝜆𝐶)𝑃2(𝑡)                             (7) 
These set of the differential equations are solved by 
both separating the variables and integrating factor 
methods and the initial conditions of 𝑃0 = 1, 𝑃1 =
0, 𝑃2 = 0 &𝑃3 = 0 are substituted into general solution 
obtained to obtain the constant of integration, hence a 
particular solution for each equation yield, 
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𝑃0(𝑡) = 𝑒
(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴,+ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝑡                                                  (8) 
𝑃1(𝑡) = 𝑒
(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝑡 − 𝑒(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴,+ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝑡                      (9) 
𝑃2(𝑡) = 𝑒
(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴+𝜆𝐶)𝑡 − 𝑒(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴+ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝑡                 (10) 
𝑃3(𝑡) = 1 + 𝑒
(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴+ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝑡  − 𝑒(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴,+𝜆𝐶)𝑡
− 𝑒(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝑡                                     (11) 
For 2𝑜𝑜2𝐴,𝐵  configuration, the system is unavailable if 
at least one of the components A or B failed upon 
demand and the corresponding states are 1, 2 and 3. 
Hence, the sum of the state probabilities is  
𝑃𝐹𝐷2𝑜𝑜2𝐴,𝐵 = 𝑃1(𝑡) + 𝑃2(𝑡) + 𝑃3(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑃0(𝑡)
= 1 − 𝑒(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴+𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝑡                      (12) 
The average probability of failure on demand for 
2𝑜𝑜2𝐴,𝐵  is calculated by taking the average sum of the 
probabilities in state 1, 2, and 3 over the time 
interval(0, 𝜏). 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔      =
1
𝜏
∫ 1 − 𝑒(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴+ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝑡
𝜏
0
𝑑𝑡  (13) 
Integrating equation(13), then: 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
= (
(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴 +  𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵 + 𝜆𝐶)𝜏 + 𝑒
(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴+ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝜏 − 1
(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵 + 𝜆𝐶)𝜏
)  (14) 
Recall that: 
𝑒(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴+ 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵+𝜆𝐶)𝜏
= 1 − (𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵 + 𝜆𝐶)𝜏
+




+ ⋯  (15) 
The first three terms of Taylor’s series for exponential 
function in equation (15)are substituted in 
equation[11]. After cancellation of equal terms, the 
𝑃𝐹𝐷2𝑜𝑜2𝐴,𝐵 is  
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝐴,𝐵
(2𝑜𝑜2) =
(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴 +  𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐵)𝜏
2
                            (16) 
For 2oo2 configuration, it is reasonable to assume that 
if one component fails the system will fail, even though, 
the failure of the two components might not occur due 
to common cause failure. Invariably, NooN (𝑁 = 1,2, … ) 
configurations do not exist, hence, the contribution due 
to common cause failure is neglected.  
In the same vein, the average probability of failure on 
demand,𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔  for series configuration of non-
identical components A and B is computed by taking 
the 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔  of state 3. 𝑃3(𝑡) over the time interval (0, 𝜏) 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐴,𝐵















              (18) 
Equation (18) is further split based on the contribution 
of independent failure,𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔














                          (20) 
𝜆𝐶  represents the representative failure rates for 
channel A and B and it is expressed as 
𝜆𝐶 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈,𝐴,𝐵𝛽𝐴,𝐵                                          (21) 
In [13], [14] geometric mean approach for a 
representative failure rate (𝜆𝐷𝑈,𝐴,𝐵) was suggested. 
However, the problem with geometric mean is that for 
components, sub-systems or channels with different 
failure rate or PFD, the “weighting” of the largest failure 
rate or PFD will become dominating and this might 
cause the CCF contribution to exceed the likelihood of 
independent failure of the most reliable component or 
channel. A conservative approach, lowest failure rate, is 
proposed which improves the probability of failure on 
demand of the lowest in the case of worst event 
because most reliable component or channel will not 
fail more often. The beta-factor,𝜆𝐷𝑈,𝐴,𝐵 expressed the 
contribution of each fraction of individual failure rate to 
common cause failure in the channel and it is selected 
based on the maximum β (refer to equation(21)) of the 
channel from conditional probability point of view 
contrary to  the pragmatic minimum or average β 
suggested in[13][15]. 
 
4.1 𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈for 1oo2 and 2oo3 Non-Identical 
Components 
The computation of PFD for these configurations is 
based on the following assumptions: 
For 1oo2 and 1oo3 configurations the dangerous 
undetected failure rates of the valve (𝜆𝐷𝑈
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒)) and 
valve E ((𝜆𝐷𝑈
(𝐸))  are considered as the lowest 
dangerous failure rates respectively. 
The beta-factor for the valve is the maximum value for 
1oo2 and the beta-factor for valve E is the maximum for 
1oo3 configurations. 
Geometric mean of the CCF failure rates of two valves is 
𝜆𝐷𝑈,𝐴,𝐵 = √(𝜆𝐴 . 𝜆𝐵) and 𝜆𝐷𝑈,𝐴,𝐵…,𝑁 = √(𝜆𝐴 . 𝜆𝐵.…𝜆𝑁) for 
N valves. 
 
4.2. 𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 Calculations, Results and Findings 
The overall average probability of failure on demand 
for the burner management systems shown in figure 1is 
computed as: 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔




(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟)                            (22) 
The unreliability data for the components is given in 
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Table 3: Simplified formulae for PFD based on Markov derivation for non-identical component: 
Configuration Geometric mean Approach Lowest Failure rate Approach 
1oo2 𝑃𝐹𝐷 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐴,𝐵
(1𝑜𝑜2)      ≈  𝛽𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝐴
(1𝑜𝑜1) 
𝑃𝐹𝐷 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐴,𝐵






















Table 4: Unreliability data for the BMS adopted from[5]. 
component 
Unreliability data for BMS 
Extracted values 




3.9 × 10−8 - 90% B 
SIS Analogue 
Input (AI) 
7.4 × 10−10 2% >90% B 
SIS common 
Circuitry (CC) 
8.0 × 10−10 2% >99% B 
SIS Digital 
Output (DO) 
2.2 × 10−10 2% >99% B 
Solenoid 3.9 × 10−7 - 62% A 
Actuator 3.4 × 10−7 - 82.6% A 
Valve 3.0 × 10−7 - 48% A 
 
4.2.1. Sensors 
Pressure transmitters PT0106A, PT0106B and 
PT0106C are located on the main gas header on the fuel 
gas skid and each transmitter is connected 
independently to analogue input of the SIS (on a 
separate not redundant input cards). In the SIS, a 2oo3 
configuration is applied, hence, the channel comprising 
transmitter and analogue input has a failure rate  
𝜆𝐷𝑈(𝑃𝑇,𝐴𝐼) = 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑃𝑇 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐼 = 3.9 × 10
−8 + 7.4 × 10−10 









× 4.× 10−8 × 8750 = 1.75 × 10−10 
The combined 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(2𝑜𝑜3) is equal to 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠)  
with beta value of (𝛽 = 0.05), hence, the 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠) is computed as: 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(2𝑜𝑜3) = 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔







= 4(1.75 × 10−4)² + 2(0.05 × 1,75 × 10−4) 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(2𝑜𝑜3)  ≈ 1.7 × 10−5                                        (23) 
 
4.2.2. Logic Solver 








 × 8.0 × 10−4 × 8750) 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐) ≈ 7.0 × 10−6 
 
4.2.3. Actuator 
The 𝑃𝐷𝐹𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑒  is first calculated for single valve and the 
combined PFD_SSOVs for the network of valve is then 
computed based on single valve. It is important to point 
out that all the valves in BMS systems are identical 
including solenoids and the actuator. 
 
4.2.4.  𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 for single valve 
The digital output is arranged in 2oo2 configuration 
while the solenoid, actuator and valve are single. The 
combined PFD for the digital output, solenoid, actuator 





















(3.9 × 10−7 + 3.4 × 10−7 + 3.0
× 10−7) × 8750 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒) ≈ 4.5 × 10−3 
 
4.2.5. 𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈for Main Gas Valves 
The 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔  for channel A, 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐴) is calculated from 
two 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒) in a 1oo2 voting (with  𝛽 = 5% ). 
Subsequently, 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐵)is calculated from 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐴) 














 × (4.5 × 10−3)² + 0.05 × 4.5 × 10−3] 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐵) ≈ 1.35 × 10−3 
Channel C finally combines all the main gas valves. It 
comprises channel B and SSOV0102 (𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒)) in 
1oo2 architecture but they are not identical valve. The 
solution is obtained by both geometric approach and 
lowest failure rate for comparison. 
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(4.5 × 10−3 × 1.35 × 10−3) + 0.05
× √(4.5 × 10−3 × 1.35 × 10−3) 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑪) = 1.23 × 10−4 
















(4.5 × 10−3 × 1.35 × 10−3) + 0.05 × 1.35 × 10−3 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑪) = 6.75 × 10−5 
 
4.2.6. 𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 for Ignition Gas Valves 
 
Figure 7: Voting of the ignition gas 
 
In figure (7), the channels can be distinguished as: 
Channel D comprises SSOV0104, SSOV0106 and 
SSOV0108 in a 1oo3-arrangement with identical 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒) for the three valves. 
Channel E comprises six SSOV01X4 in 6oo6-
arrangement, with identical𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒). 
Channel F comprises D and Channel E in 1oo2-
arrangement, where the 𝑃𝐹𝐷’𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑔  for these two valves 
is not identical. 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑫) for the channel D is calculated from 
the𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒). It follows that 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔







+ 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑛 . 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒) 
= 2(4.5 × 10−3)³ + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 4.5 × 10
−3 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑫) = 2.25 × 10−4 
and that of channel E is computed as: 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑬) = 6. 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒:𝑖𝑛𝑑) = 2.70 × 10−2 
Hence, channel F which is a combination of channel D 
and F as 1oo2 non-identical valve, so that average 
probability of failure is calculated from both geometric 
approach and lowest failure rate approach. 














(2.70 × 10−2 × 2.25 × 10−4) + 0.05
× √(2.70 × 10−2 × 2.25 × 10−4) 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑭) ≈ 1.23 × 10−4 















(4.5 × 10−3  × 1.35 × 10−3) + 0.05 × 2.25 × 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐹) ≈ 1.125 × 10−5 
 
4.2.7. 𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 for Actuator 
Finally, the combination of the main gas valves 
(channel C) and ignition gas valve (channel F) in 2oo2 
configuration is referred to as Actuator. 
 
i. Geometric approach 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) = 1.23 × 10−4 + 1.23 × 10−4 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) ≈ 2.46 × 10−4 
ii. Lowest failure rate 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) = 1.75 × 10−5 + 6.75 × 10−5 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
(𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓) ≈ 8.5 × 10−5 
The overall average probability of failure on demand 
for the burner management systems is  2.71 × 10−4  
based on geometric mean approach and  1.1 × 10−5  for 
lowest failure rate. 
 
5. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
It can be deduced that the measures of safety 
performance for components or sub-system with 
unequal failure rates depends predominantly on 
common cause failure, but a single beta-factor is not 
appropriate to model the commonality of the failure as 
presented in equation (2)by[5], since  the fraction  of 
individual  failure rate that lead to common cause 
failure is enigmatic. This permits a pragmatic choice of 
beta-factor for modeling non-identical components or 
sub-systems. 
The geometric mean approach is valid if all the 
undetected dangerous failure rates are in the same 
order of magnitude. However, the estimation of the 
probability of failure on demand based on geometric 
mean approach leads to unrealistic result due to 
underestimation of PFD which can result in 
inappropriate assignment of Safety Integrity Level. 
Hence, the lowest failure rate approach improves the 
average probability of failure on demand of the lowest 
valve because most reliable valve will not fail more 
often. Both approaches are sensitive to the value of β 
factor as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of Geometric mean and lowest 
failure rate approaches to β- factor 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a Markov model was formulated to obtain 
average probability of failure on demand for a burner 
management system for non-identical sub-system 
configurations. To accurately ascertain the safety 
integrity level, two methods were proposed, the lowest 
failure rate and the geometric mean. The maximum 
beta factor was also proposed contrary to pragmatic 
choice of existing beta-factor to evaluate the 
commonality of the failure in the BMS. 
The result revealed that contribution of common cause 
failure plays an important factor in determine the 
average probability of failure on demand because the 
contribution due to independent failure is quite 
negligible and disappear into noise. This was evidence 
from both geometric mean and lowest failure rate 
approaches. It was obvious that both geometric mean 
and lowest failure rate approaches result in different 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔  values with the lowest failure rate being the 
most conservative and optimistic result. 
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